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The Public Interest Inquiry for
Permanent Injunctions or Exclusion




President Obama's 2013 veto of a US International Trade
Commission (ITC) exclusion order, issued to address Apple Inc.'s
infringement of a patent owned by Samsung, thrust the ITC's public
interest inquiry into the spotlight. Historically, however, these factors
rarely weighed against a remedy at the ITC. Likewise, US district
courts have rarely declined to issue a permanent injunction after
finding a patent valid and infringed due solely to the public interest
factor-the last of the four factors that the Supreme Court put in place
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. More recent decisions
addressing the public interest in both forums, however, show a
willingness by the adjudicators to weigh both traditional public
interest issues, such as health and well-being, and non-traditional
arguments, such as public reliance and environmental concerns,
against a patent owner's right to exclude. In this Article, we examine
some of the successful traditional and non-traditional public interest
arguments, both at the ITC and in US district courts. From this
analysis, the Article outlines how parties involved in high-stakes patent
litigation in either forum can craft public interest arguments to combat
the threat of a permanent injunction or an ITC exclusion order.
* Mr. Riley is a Partner at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP
(Finnegan). He focuses his practice on intellectual property litigation before the US International
Trade Commission, US district courts, and patent trials before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board at the US Patent and Trademark Office.
** Mr. Allen is currently a Clerk at the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and was formerly an associate at Finnegan. The authors would like to thank Kassandra Officer
for her excellent research and the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT & TECHNOLOGY
LAW Board for the edits and suggestions. All opinions and any errors are the authors' own.
751
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .................................. ...... 752
II. PUBLIC INTEREST IN PATENT LITIGATION HISTORICALLY ... 755
A. The Public Interest, the Patent Act, and Injunctions..... 755
B. Public Interest, the Tariff Act, and Exclusion Orders ... 758
III. NEW RULES AT THE ITC CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES...... 762
IV. LEARNING FROM THE DISTRICT COURTS .................. 765
A. Traditional Medical Related Considerations .... ..... 766
B. Anomalous Considerations at the District Courts ......... 767
1. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care......... ...... 768
2. z4 Technologies....................... 770
3. Kohler Co ............................ ..... 772
V. RELEASING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FROM ITS PREVIOUS
CONFINES ....................................... ..... 773
A. The Public Interest Not Confined Statutorily .... ..... 774
B. Litigation Strategies. ........................ ..... 775
1. Relate Technology to Health ................. 775
2. Argue Reliance ....................... ..... 776
3. The Environment, National Security, and
Other Considerations .................. 777
4. Narrow and Tailored Injunctions ............. 777
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................... ..... 778
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of keeping a relatively low profile in patent law,
public interest considerations are now poised to take on a more
prominent role in patent litigation. Developments in this area of
patent law have mostly percolated in the background. Despite brief
coverage of President Obama's 2013 veto of an exclusion order from
the US International Trade Commission (ITC)1 involving Apple Inc.
1. See Letter from Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman, US Trade Representative, to
Hon. Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, US Int'l Trade Comm'n (Aug. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF [hereinafter Froman Letter];
Ian Sherr & Brent Kendall, Apple Veto Likely to Upend Key Patent Battles: Ruling Promises to
Alter Strategies Some Tech Giants Use to Defend Inventions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2013, 8:20 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323420604578648272862276836 (discussing
"[t]he Obama administration's decision to overturn an international trade ruling against Apple
Inc-the first such veto in more than 25 years . . . ." and reporting that the veto could ultimately
"change the strategies some of the world's biggest technology companies use to defend their
inventions"); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012) ("If the Commission determines ... that there
is a violation of [the] section, it shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded from entry
into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public
[Vol. 17:3:751752
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that, according to some, may have been "designed as a signal to the
ITC to stop issuing injunctive relief without full consideration of the
public interest at stake,"2 public interest considerations have received
little attention. Indeed, that news aside, from a historical perspective
the public interest rarely affects the issuance of exclusion orders at
the ITC, 3 notwithstanding a statutory mandate to consider such public
interest.4 Correspondingly, while the "public interest" is one of the
four factors used by federal district courts when determining whether
to issue injunctive relief in patent cases under the Supreme Court's
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 5 it has typically existed
as one of the least explored and least utilized of the eBay factors.6
Following the ruling in eBay, however, federal district courts
have quietly released several noteworthy decisions concerning the
public interest.7 And despite an appellate decision from the US Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-the court with exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over patent and ITC cases8 -suggesting that the
public interest factors in the two respective forums do not inform one
another,9 it is clear that developments in one forum can and do
provide guidance for the other. Indeed, common sense dictates that
health and welfare . . . it finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry."); id. §
1337(j)(2) ("If ... the President, for policy reasons, disapproves such determination and notifies
the Commission of his disapproval, then, effective on the date of such notice, such determination
and the action taken under subsection (d), (e), (f), (g), or (i) of this section with respect thereto
shall have no force or effect."); Administration of the Trade Agreements Program, Exec. Order
No. 11,846, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,291 (Mar. 27, 1975) (delegating the President's authority to veto
exclusion order to a "United States Trade Representative").
2. Dennis Crouch, Is It Time to End the USITC's Jurisdiction Over Patent Cases?,
PATENTLYO (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/08/is-it-time-to-end-the-usites-
jurisdiction-over-patent-cases.html (predicting also that "some interesting development of the
law and theory of public-interest in enforcing patent rights" may be in store).
3. Only four ITC decisions have used public interest to deny an otherwise proper
exclusion order. See infra Part II.B.
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012).
5. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
6. E.g., Crouch, supra note 2 ("In the eBay line of cases, the public interest is typically
the least-explored factor.").
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012).
9. Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
("Given the different statutory underpinnings for relief before the Commission ... and before the
district courts in suits for patent infringement, this court holds that eBay does not apply to
Commission remedy determinations under Section 337. The Commission is not required to apply
the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief used by district courts when deciding whether
to issue the equitable remedy of a permanent injunction. Unlike the equitable concerns at issue
in eBay, the Commission's issuance of an exclusion order is based on the statutory criteria set
forth in Section 337."). But see Colleen Chien & Mark Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (2013); Mike Heins, Selling Congress on eBay: Should
Congress Force the ITC to Apply the eBay Standard?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 589, 609 (2013).
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the increased prominence of "public interest" considerations in one
forum would logically carry with it increased prominence in the other.
Thus, while the Federal Circuit resolved the question of whether the
"public interest inquiry in [the ITC] context is similar to the
traditional test for injunctive relief that district courts apply under
[eBay]," in Spansion, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the
opportunity to argue and win on "public interest" considerations may
be ripening in both forums.'0
Exploiting these opportunities may be particularly fruitful at
the ITC, where the lack of access to traditional damages remedies
could very well make a "public interest" victory a total and complete
victory. Litigants before the ITC may be especially well advised to
critically evaluate and deploy the use of public interest positions. This
is due to the implementation of new procedural rules that place the
public interest analysis at the very beginning of an ITC investigation
and the arguably changing tide reflected in the Executive Office's
recent exclusion order veto." Because there are a limited number of
opinions addressing public interest considerations at either the ITC or
the district courts, alleged infringers can and should use both sets of
precedent to help shape public interest arguments, notwithstanding
the Federal Circuit's dicta in Spansion.12
With that goal in mind, this Article briefly explains in Part II
the historical context of the "public interest" in patent litigation before
federal district courts and the ITC. Part III then outlines the new
rules that govern consideration of the public interest at the ITC.
Next, using exemplary cases from the federal district courts and the
ITC, Part IV digests the current landscape of public interest
10. Spansion, 629 F.3d at 1357; see also id. at 1359 ("The difference between exclusion
orders granted under Section 337 and injunctions granted under the Patent Act . . . follows 'the
long-standing principle that importation is treated differently than domestic activity."'). But see
Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV.
529, 530, 533 (2009) (proposing that "Congress amend § 337 to harmonize ITC patent law with
the Patent Act").
11. See Froman Letter, supra note 1; see also Certain Electronic Devices, Including
Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Processing Devices, and Tablet
Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, Comm'n Op. (July 5, 2013) (Commissioner Aranoff noting that
"[tihe Commission is not a policy-making body and is not empowered to make [policy decisions on
SEPs]. The President may, should he so choose, weigh the relative risks of hold-up and reverse
hold-up in deciding whether to disapprove the remedy the Commission is issuing today."). But
see Press Release, Office of the US Trade Representative, Ambassador Froman's Decision on the
USITC's Investigation of Certain Electronic Digital Media Devices (Oct. 8, 2013), available at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/20 13/October/Froman-decision-
USITC-investigation (allowing "the Commission's determination in Certain Electronic Digital
Media Devices and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-796, to become final" in the
parallel investigation instituted by Apple against Samsung, which ordered exclusion of Samsung
products).
12. Spansion, 629 F.3d at 1357.
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arguments. Finally, Part V discusses where public interest arguments
may be headed in the future and recommends aspects of the public
interest that parties should keep in mind going forward when arguing
before the ITC or the district courts. Compelling appeals to the
oft-neglected public interest considerations could transform a
potentially devastating outcome into a manageable hurdle.
II. PUBLIC INTEREST IN PATENT LITIGATION HISTORICALLY
The public interest played a negligible role in patent litigation
historically. The Patent Act, which provides a statutory cause of
action for patent infringement, makes no mention of public interest
considerations and, until recently, federal district courts rarely
considered the public interest when fashioning equitable remedies,
typically in the form of injunctions. The other major forum for patent
litigation in the United States, the ITC, is a quasi-judicial
independent federal agency governed by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930.13 But, while its guiding statutory provisions include specific
mandates for public interest considerations, they have historically
been seldom explored. An understanding of this historical dearth of
precedent helps illuminate why even subtle changes in precedent
today may provide some insight into successful litigation
opportunities.
A. The Public Interest, the Patent Act, and Injunctions
It is only a common law construct that mandates consideration
of the "public interest" values at stake before a federal district court
issues a permanent injunction. The Patent Act does not even mention,
let alone require, consideration of the public interest before granting
equitable relief, which in district courts typically complements or
supplements traditional monetary damages remedies. In fact, for
much of US legal history, and certainly for most of the last three
decades, not even the common law allowed much equitable discretion
over the grant of injunctions. The Federal Circuit, chartered in 1982,
established a historical precedent of essentially granting injunctions
automatically after a finding of patent infringement. The Federal
Circuit's historical preference to grant permanent injunctions "stems
from a belief that once infringement has been established denying
a patentee the right to exclude is contrary to the laws of property."14
13. Tariff (Smoot-Hawley) Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590.
14. Richard B. Klar, Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.: The Right to Exclude Under
U.S. Patent Law and the Public Interest, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 852, 855 (2006)
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Under that traditional precedent, the Federal Circuit only denied
permanent injunctions in "rare instances" where a patentee's decision
not to practice the patent "frustrate[d] an important public need for
the invention."15  In other words, there was a presumption of
irreparable harm once infringement of a patent was established.
The few exceptions to this presumption appear in medicine or
public sanitation cases.16 In City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge,
Inc., a case arising prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the US
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to issue an injunction
for patent infringement where it would have left "the entire
community without any means for disposal of raw sewage."17 After
first acknowledging that "[o]rdinarily courts will protect [a] patent
right by injunctive process" and finding that "both parties have strong
equities," the court was only swayed after acknowledging that no
alternative existed "other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby
polluting its waters and endangering the health and lives of that and
other adjoining communities."1 8 Similarly, the Federal Circuit in a
1988 decision, Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, weighed the
factors for granting an injunction and found that the district court did
not err "by specifically excluding Abbott cancer test kits and Abbott
hepatitis kits from the preliminary injunction order" and not
excluding others.19 The district court explained that "[w]hatever else
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) and Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionic Sys. Corp., 347 F.
Supp. 2d 114 (D. Del. 2004)); see also id. at 858 ("The constitution provides for the framework for
a patent owner to have exclusive rights within the system. The right to exclude is of primary
importance in order to encourage inventors to share their technology with the public in exchange
for a limited (by time) monopoly."); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of
which the patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to exclude others from use of his
property.").
15. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
16. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 86-7461/AK (PX), 1987 WL 123997, at
*22 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 1987) (finding public interest required that injunction not stop supply of
medical test kits that the patentee itself was not marketing), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 956 (9th
Cir. 1945) (finding public interest warranted refusal of injunction on irradiation of
oleomargarine); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934)
(refusing injunction against city operation of sewage disposal plant because of public health
danger). But see, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459 (1940) ("The
patent monopoly of one invention may no more be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly of
another, than for the exploitation of an unpatented article, or for the exploitation or promotion of
a business not embraced within the patent."); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463
(1938) ("[Elvery use of a patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly on unpatented
material is prohibited. . . . [W]hatever the nature of the device by which the owner of the patent
seeks to effect unauthorized extension of the monopoly.").
17. 69 F.2d at 593.
18. Id.
19. 849 F.2d at 1458.
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the court does, it will not cut off the supply of monoclonal test kits for
cancer patients who are now using the Abbott product" and that "the
court is reluctant to cut off that supply [of hepatitis kits] when neither
Hybritech nor its licensees have an alternative."2 0 A handful of other
district courts followed a similar line of reasoning regarding other
preliminary injunctions for medical-related devices21-and once,
somewhat humorously, for aerial footage of the Super Bowl.22 There is
no evidence, however, that the public interest was ever a significant
consideration in other fields of invention or in granting permanent
injunctive relief. To the contrary, most district courts that even
considered the public interest while analyzing a motion for injunctive
relief gave it only a mere cursory examination.
In 2006, however, the Supreme Court fundamentally changed
the equation for determining whether to grant equitable relief in the
form of permanent injunctions following a finding of patent
infringement in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.23 The Court
chastised the Federal Circuit for its rigid application of injunctions
upon a showing of liability-its "automatic rule"-and instead
imposed "the traditional four-factor test for injunctions."24 One of the
four factors-the "public interest"25-requires a court to affirmatively
address the public interest before issuing a permanent injunction in
all cases considering an injunction. While the Supreme Court
signaled a shift of emphasis toward public interest considerations, the
scope of what it meant remains relatively untested.26
20. Hybritech, 1987 WL 123997, at *21.
21. E.g., Neuromedical Sys., Inc. v. Neopath, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 5245 (JFK), 1998 WL
264845, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1998); Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 855 F.
Supp. 1500, 1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 762 F. Supp. 480, 509 (D.
Conn. 1991).
22. CF Inflight, Ltd. v. Cablecam Sys., Ltd., No. CIVA. 03-CV-5374, 2004 WL 234372,
at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2004) ("While there may not exist a compelling concern for public health,
there is most certainly a public demand and interest in experiencing this visual perspective.").
23. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
24. Id.
25. Id. ("[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test
before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate
to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.").
26. See SUZANNE MICHEL ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 253, 255 (2011) ("After
enumerating the four equitable factors in the eBay decision, the opinion of the full Court gave
little guidance on their application.").
7572015]
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B. Public Interest, the Tariff Act, and Exclusion Orders
Unlike the federal district courts, which are required to
apply the Patent Act and may also fashion equitable remedies, the
ITC is strictly governed by Section 337(d)(1) of the Tariff Act. That
statute provides that "[i]f the Commission determines ... that there is
a violation of [the] section, it shall direct that the articles
concerned .. . be excluded from entry into the United States, unless,
after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health
and welfare . . . it finds that such articles should not be excluded from
entry."27 In contrast to federal district court litigation, monetary
damages are not awarded by the ITC, so an exclusion order is often
the only remedy at issue. And, unlike litigation under the Patent Act,
Section 337 directs the ITC to begin with the premise that any goods
found to be infringing intellectual property rights are to be excluded
from importation into the United States.28 A respondent at the ITC
bears the burden of showing that an exception exists; the opposite
party carries the burden in the district court after the Supreme
Court's decision in eBay.
In addition to "public welfare," the ITC governing statute
enumerates three other, more specific, public interest considerations:
(1) "competitive conditions in the United States economy," (2) "the
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States," and (3) the "United States consumers." Since the
implementation of Section 337 in 1974,29 the Commission has only
denied exclusion orders in the name of the "public interest" a handful
of times. Despite the significance Congress intended the public
interest to play, public interest considerations have been given
minimal, ancillary analysis in comparison to the violation, i.e.,
liability, phase of an investigation at the ITC. 30 Only four ITC
decisions have used the public interest exception as a means to deny
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012).
28. See Kumar, supra note 10, at 567 (stating that "[i]f the ITC finds that an imported
article infringes a patent, then the default presumption under § 337 is that it will award an
exclusion order" and that "denials of injunctive relief after a finding of infringement are
extremely uncommon").
29. Compare Tariff (Smoot-Hawley) Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590,
703, with Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978, 2053 (1975) and
19 U.S.C § 1337(d) (Supp. 1975); see also Harvey Kaye & Paul Plaia, Jr., Developments in Unfair
Trade Practices in International Trade: A Review of the Third and Fourth Years Under Section
337 as Amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 115, 156 (1979).
30. See S. REP. No. 93-1298 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7197; id. at
7326 ("The Committee feels that the public interest must be paramount in the administration of
this statute."); see also Will E. Leonard & F. David Foster, The Metamorphosis of the U.S.
International Trade Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719, 754-55
(1976) (noting that the addition was "[p]erhaps the most novel amendment").
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an exclusion order where it was otherwise appropriate.3 1 As discussed
below, those four public interest opinions are helpful waypoints, but
each analysis is fact specific, and provides frustratingly little specific
guidance as to the contours of the exception.
The first of the four decisions involved the importation of
proprietary automotive crankpin grinding machines.32 In Certain
Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the Commission announced that, for
"the first time," it had "determined that the public interest factors
preclude[d] imposition of a remdy [sic]."" After reciting portions of
the relevant legislative history, the Commission discussed how
"the availability of crankpin grinders to Ford is a critical element
in Ford's program to meet the fuel economy standards
mandated by Congress."3 4  It ultimately found "that the public
interest considerations . . . are stronger than complainant's rights to
enforcement of its patent monopoly."3 5 Significantly, however, this
investigation was filed during the energy crisis of 1979-a result of
the Iranian Revolution.3 6 Oil production in the Middle East had been
disrupted, and US consumers, with fresh memories of the energy
crisis of 1973,37 began to buy gasoline in a panic to prepare for
31. The Federal Circuit, in Spansion, explained that the common thread throughout
these investigations is an "inadequate supply within the United States-by both the patentee
and domestic licensees-[such] that an exclusion order would deprive the public of products
necessary for some important health or welfare need: energy efficient automobiles, basic
scientific research, or hospital equipment." Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
32. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022 (Dec.
1, 1979) (Final).
33. Id. at 10.
34. Id. at 11. Congress had mandated higher efficiency cars under the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards of 1975, and it was the first time fuel economy
regulations were imposed on passenger cars-for example, 18.0 miles per gallon by 1978. See
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (establishing the CAFE
standards); see also, e.g., Roger H. Bezdek & Robert M. Wendling, Fuel Efficiency and the
Economy, 93 AM. SCIENTIST 132, 132 (2005).
35. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022 at 20-
21 (Dec. 1, 1979) (Final).
36. See JOHN D. STEMPEL, INSIDE THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 165-94, 317-18 (1981);
HEATHER LEHR WAGNER, MILESTONES IN MODERN WORLD HISTORY: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
63-75 (2010) ("By December 1978, the violence in Iran seemed out of control.").
37. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1973 OIL EMBARGO: ENERGY
TRENDS SINCE THE FIRST MAJOR U.S. ENERGY CRISIS 1 (1998) (stating that "[t]he 1973 Arab Oil
Embargo was the first oil supply disruption to cause major price increases and a worldwide
energy crisis" and that "[v]irtually all spare oil production capacity was in the Middle East when
the Arab Oil Embargo began in October 1973"); see also ROBERT E. HUNTER, THE ENERGY 'CRISIS'
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 3 (1973) ("Since 1972, concern has been growing . . . about an
impending energy 'crisis.' This concern was dramatized by the shortage of fuel oil in the Eastern
and Middle Western states during the winter of 1972-73 .... .").
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anticipated gasoline rationing.38 "[T]he fact that Congress and the
President ... established a policy requiring automotive companies to
increase . . . fuel economy .. . and that some of these companies [were]
encountering difficulties in obtaining automatic crankpin grinders on
a timely basis," swayed the Commission.39 Due to the unique facts
surrounding this investigation, the opinion provides only limited
guidance and applicability to today's patent infringement litigations.
One year after Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, in 1980,
the Commission once again found that public interest factors trumped
the property rights of a patent holder in Certain Inclined-Field
Acceleration Tubes.40  Several universities used the infringing
accelerator tubes, which were allegedly "greatly superior in
performance" to others in the market, to study nuclear structures.41
The Commission found "that basic scientific research, such
as ... nuclear structure research . . . is precisely the kind of activity
intended by Congress to be included when it required the Commission
to consider ... the public health and welfare."42 Moreover, it stated
that its determination "denies part of the rewards of having conducted
that research in the past, but broadens the benefit to the public now
by permitting research with a wider range of devices."43 Like the
investigation involving crankpin grinders, this case arose against a
unique political backdrop: the Cold War44 and the Soviet Union's
invasion of Afghanistan.45 Thus, it must be taken in its appropriate
context, recognizing the sensitivities surrounding nuclear research
during that time period.
The Commission again denied exclusionary relief in light of the
public interest in Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus.4 6 The
Commission determined it was not in the public interest to exclude
38. See, e.g., DAVID T. HARTGEN ET AL., CHANGES IN TRAVEL IN RESPONSE TO THE 1979
ENERGY CRISIS (1979); LESTER A. SOBEL, ENERGY CRISIS: 1977-1979, at 3 (1980) ("The President
of the United States went on nationwide television to inform the people that 'the energy crisis is
real."').
39. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022 at 20
(Dec. 1, 1979) (Final).
40. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119 (Dec. 1980) (Final).
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Id.
44. See generally MATTHEW FARISH, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICA'S COLD WAR (2010);
RICHARD SMOKE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE COLD WAR (3d ed. 1993).
45. See M. HASSAN KAKAR, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION AND THE AFGHAN
RESPONSE, 1979-1982, at 1-17 (1995).
46. Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
182/188, USITC Pub. 1667 (Oct. 1984) (Final).
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the importation of specialized hospital beds for burn patients where
the complainant could not meet the existing market demand and
where no comparable substitute burn bed existed.47 In a very brief
opinion, the Commission focused on the ability of the complainant to
meet the production and distribution needs of the public in the
"expanding market" for specialized burn beds-a market it had
apparently created itself. Without a clear articulation of a factual
basis or in-depth legal reasoning, the Commission concluded that "if a
temporary exclusion order were issued some patients might not have
access to burn beds at all in the interim period."48
After years of silence, the Commission, in 2011, issued a fourth
opinion in which it found that the public interest demanded that
certain infringing 3G handheld wireless communication devices, such
as mobile phones and PDAs, that were "previously imported" were
exempt from an exclusion order.49 In Certain Baseband Processor
Chips, Broadcom filed a complaint against Qualcomm for importing
patent-infringing wireless communication devices that had
implications for the 3G networks throughout the entire country.50 In
an unusual step, "first responders"5 1 throughout the nation testified to
the adverse effect that exclusion would have on their ability to protect
the public in case of an emergency. First responders argued that they
heavily relied on GPS positioning systems and the ED-VO
infrastructure generally.52  In a show of measured restraint, the
Commission stated: "[W]e do not accept the general proposition that, if
the infringing activity is great enough, the public interest forbids a
remedy."53 Accordingly, it structured relief that "ha[d] a much- more
limited impact on availability of 3G-capable handsets, and thus a
lesser impact on the public interest."4 In other words, unlike the
earlier three public interest opinions, the Commission developed a
detailed opinion that provided limited exceptions to the exclusion
47. Id. at 23.
48. Id.
49. Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio)
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Prods. Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone
Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258 at 3 (Oct. 2011) (Final) [hereinafter Certain
Baseband Processor Chips].
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 10-12, 30, 140. "First responders" refers to emergency personnel who arrive
first at the scene of an accident and those in the first response chain of information, such as
dispatchers.
52. Id. ED-VO is a complex telecommunications standard for wireless data
transmissions through radio signals that involves multiplexing techniques to optimize data
throughput.
53. Id. at 153.
54. Id.
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order, including a sunset provision that allowed respondents time to
phase products off of the market.
The Certain Baseband Processor Chips investigation provides
perhaps the most insight into consideration of the public interest at
the ITC, until President Obama's August 2013 exclusion order veto of
Apple's infringing devices.55 In that investigation, the Commission
issued an exclusion order banning importation of certain Apple
iPhones, iPods, and iPads found to be incorporating infringing
technology covered by patents owned by Samsung. Interestingly, in
fashioning its order, the ITC noted that "[tihe Commission is not a
policy-making body and is not empowered to make [policy decisions on
Standard Essential Patents]. The President may, should he so choose,
weigh the relative risks of hold-up and reverse hold-up in deciding
whether to disapprove the remedy the Commission is issuing today."56
The President accepted the invitation to weigh in on the policy
implications of banning devices that use technology covered in
Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). In a letter from the Executive
Office of the President to the Commission, Ambassador Michael B.G.
Froman explained the President's veto and added that "in any
future cases involving SEPs that are subject to voluntary
FRAND [fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory] commitments, the
Commission should be certain to . . . examine thoroughly and carefully
on its own initiative the public interest issues presented both at the
onset of its proceeding and when determining whether a particular
remedy is in the public interest."57 This letter adds gloss to how the
Commission may interpret Section 337's "public interest"
considerations going forward.
III. NEW RULES AT THE ITC CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES
The language of the Trade Act has changed very little since the
amendments in 1974 that added the public interest factors, but the
Commission recently approved new regulations that affect the
application of those factors enshrined under Section 337. Under the
new regulations, consideration of the public interest has transitioned
from a final, secondary step in Section 337 investigations to a
prominent requirement at the very commencement of an
investigation. The new regulations specify that complainants must
55. See Froman Letter, supra note 1.
56. Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable
Music and Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, Comm'n Op. (July 5,
2013).
57. Froman Letter, supra note 1.
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file, "concurrently with the complaint, a separate statement of public
interest."5 8 The purpose of the statement is to address "how issuance
of the requested relief . .. in th[e] investigation could affect the public
health and welfare in the United States, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive
articles in the United States, or United States consumers."5 9 The
regulations also provide that the submission address: (1) how the
articles are used; (2) any public health, safety, or welfare concerns;
(3) directly competitive articles that could replace the subject articles;
(4) the capacity to replace the volume of articles subject to the
requested remedial orders; and (5) the impact of exclusion on US
consumers.60 Respondents and interested third parties may file a
response to the patentee's public interest statement within eight
days.61
Importantly, the new rules allow the Commission to delegate
fact-finding on the public interest to an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). 62 This is significant because it indicates that greater and more
dedicated resources may be assigned the task of examining the public
interest considerations. More resources may result in a more detailed
record, more thorough fact-finding, and well-reasoned opinions. It
also means that parties on the receiving end of an ITC complaint have
new opportunities to present creative and persuasive public interest
arguments that could lessen the otherwise devastating effect of an
exclusion order. Complainants will need to develop a coherent
strategy for addressing all public interest angles before placing a case
into the fast-paced world of the ITC docket. Conversely, respondents
need to anticipate such arguments and develop robust public interest
defenses.
While the ITC only delegated fact-finding on the public interest
to the presiding ALJ in 14 percent of investigations instituted from
the time the new rules took effect on November 18, 2011, to the end of
2012,63 that number appears to be on the rise. For example, in the
58. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.8(b) (2012); see also Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 76
Fed. Reg. 64,803 (Oct. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 210).
59. 19 C.F.R. § 210.8(b).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 210.10(b).
63. See Certain Optoelectronic Devices for Fiber Optic Commc'n, Inv. No. 337-TA-860,
77 Fed. Reg. 65,713 (Oct. 30, 2012); Certain Sintered Rare Earth Magnets, Inv. No. 337-TA-855,
77 Fed. Reg. 58,578 (Sept. 21, 2012); Certain Two-Way Global Satellite Commc'n Devices, Sys.
and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-854, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,579 (Sept. 21, 2012); Certain Wireless
Consumer Elec. Devices and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-853, 77 Fed. Reg. 51,572 (Aug. 24,
2012); Certain CMOS Image Sensors and Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-846, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,488 (June
6, 2012); Certain CMOS Image Sensors and Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-846, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,488
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first quarter of 2013, the ITC delegated fact-finding in 40 percent of
the investigations instituted.64 So far, only a handful of investigations
have proceeded far enough to result in an initial determination from
an ITC ALJ on the public interest. But, based on those few data
points, there is reason to believe that the public interest factors are
taken seriously and can significantly alter the course of litigation.
For example, in an investigation instituted by
X2Y Attenuators, LLC against Intel Corporation, Apple Inc.,
Hewlett-Packard Company, and entities affiliated with Intel, the ITC
delegated fact-finding on the public interest to an ALJ. 6 5 Although
that investigation was eventually terminated by the ITC, the ALJ did
address the "public interest" in his initial determination and found the
"unique circumstances of this investigation" justified "tailoring" the
remedy.66 Specifically, the ALJ found that the evidence submitted
during the hearing supported the conclusion that "there [is] a lack of
substitutes for the accused Intel microprocessors[;] there are also no
adequate substitutes for the accused HP servers, HP computers, and
Apple computers."67 The ALJ explained that, in his view, "it is not
clear that the Commission should necessarily issue an exclusion order
barring from importation all Intel microprocessors, as well as any
Apple and HP products, if they are found to infringe the asserted
(June 6, 2012); Certain Consumer Elec. and Display Devices and Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-836, 77
Fed. Reg. 21,584 (Apr. 10, 2012); Certain Commc'n Equip., Components, and Prods., Including
Power Over Ethernet Telephones, Switches, Wireless Access Points, Routers and Other Devices
Used in LANs, and Cameras, Inv. No. 337-TA-817, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,436 (Dec. 7, 2011); Certain
Automotive GPS Navigation Sys., Components, and Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-814, 76 Fed. Reg.
72,442 (Nov. 23, 2011); Certain Integrated Solar Power Sys. and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-
811, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,284 (Nov. 8, 2011); Certain Dynamic Random Access Memory and Nand
Flash Memory Devices and Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-803, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,417 (Sept. 7, 2011);
Certain Microprocessors and Prods, Inv. No. 337-TA-781, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,895 (July 7, 2011);
Certain Flip-Top Vials and Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-779, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,576 (June 22, 2011);
Certain Vaginal Ring Birth Control Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-768, 76 Fed. Reg. 17,444 (Mar. 29,
2011); Certain Gemcitabine and Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-766, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,445 (Mar. 23,
2011); Certain Reduced Ignition Proclivity Cigarette Paper Wrappers and Prods., Inv. No. 337-
TA-756, 76 Fed. Reg. 4935 (Jan. 27, 2011) (all ITC Notices of Investigation).
64. See Certain Integrated Circuit Devices and Prods. Containing the Same, Inv. No.
337-TA-873, 78 Fed. Reg. 16,533 (Mar. 15, 2013); Certain Wireless Commc'ns Base Stations and
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-871, 78 Fed. Reg. 13,895 (Mar. 1, 2013); Certain Balloon
Dissection Devices & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-866, 78 Fed. Reg. 6838 (Jan. 31,
2013); Certain Elec. Devices, Including Wireless Commc'n Devices, Tablet Computers, Media
Players, & Televisions, & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-862, 78 Fed. Reg. 1247 (Jan. 8,
2013) (all ITC Notices of Investigation).
65. Certain Microprocessors, Components Thereof and Prods. Containing Same, Inv.
No. 337-TA-781, 2012 WL 6883205, *3-*4 (Dec. 14, 2012) (Initial Determination) [hereinafter
Certain Microprocessors]; see also Andrew Riley, Examining the Evolving Role the Public Interest
Plays at the ITC, 6 LANDSLIDE 40, 41 (2013).
66. Certain Microprocessors, 2012 WL 6883205 at *174.
67. Id. at *168.
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patents."68 The decision shows that evidence on the public interest,
such as expected job losses, lack of comparable substitutes, and harm
to US manufacturing, can have a meaningful impact at the ITC.
Maybe more importantly, it may show the ITC's increased willingness
to weigh public interest concerns against a patent holder's rights and
to recommend a modified exclusion order addressing those concerns.
Taken together, the ITC's opinion in Certain Baseband
Processor Chips and the ITC's new rules governing the public interest
analysis show that the Commission was already taking independent
steps to ensure the public interest received adequate attention well
before the President's recent veto and Ambassador Froman's letter.69
What remains is a relatively blank slate for attorneys of alleged
infringers to extend the once restrictive, or altogether, unclear
confines of "public interest" in ways that can benefit and protect their
clients. The ALJ's initial determination in the investigation instituted
by X2Y Attenuators shows that potential. Moreover, such
developments and determinations will have impacts that will likely
spill over and influence district court patent litigation, just as district
court litigation can help inform public interest considerations at the
ITC.
IV. LEARNING FROM THE DISTRICT COURTS
The ITC has issued only four opinions limiting or denying
exclusion orders in light of the "public interest" for products found to
be infringing otherwise valid intellectual property. Those four options
span a timeframe of over thirty years. Thus, they provide only a small
set of data points from which to extrapolate trends. The vast majority
of ITC opinions on the "public interest" merely state that it does not
alter the decision.70 With the expanded opportunities for parties to
argue the public interest at the ITC, litigants can draw useful
guidance from decisions at the district court level. As of this writing,
at least fifteen post-eBay permanent injunction opinions7 1 address the
68. Id.
69. See Froman Letter, supra note 1.
70. See, e.g., Chien & Lemley, supra note 9, at 5 ("To date, the ITC hasn't given these
public interest factors many teeth. We think the ITC should pay more attention to the public
interest, using prevailing economic theory and its precedents to assess the impact of patent
injunctions on consumers and competitive conditions."); see also id. at 19-20; Certain Electronic
Devices with Image Processing Systems, Components Thereof, and Associated Software, Inv. No.
337-TA-724, Order No. 25 (Mar. 4, 2011) ("[T]hese so-called 'public interest' issues are not
normally considered by an administrative law judge in the first instance.").
71. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1162-63 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
affd in part, vacated in part, 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013); ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v.
Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 641, 652-53 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff'd in part, vacated in
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public interest in a meaningful way. And despite the Federal Circuit's
suggestion that the ITC and district court opinions regarding the
public interest do not inform one another,72 it can be valuable to
examine those district court cases where parties made successful
public interest arguments. Since the public interest consideration at
both forums is an equitable decision, weighted at the discretion of
judge or Commission, successful strains of argumentation may have
universal appeal.
A. Traditional Medical Related Considerations
Whether a legacy from the Federal Circuit's pre-eBay line of
decisions or something more intrinsic about medicine and injuries, the
district courts' perspectives of what constitutes "public interest" tends
to somewhat narrowly focus on three medically-related criteria: public
health, public welfare, and public safety.7 3 In fact, some district courts
have curtailed their investigation of the public interest simply because
the technology "does not implicate public health or safety concerns."74
Other district courts have stated that "there are rare and limited
circumstances in which an injunction would be contrary to a
significant public interest such as health and safety concerns,"75 and
part, 694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm.
Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 681, 695-96 (D.N.J. 2011), aff'd and remanded, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland
GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., 748 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Metso Minerals, Inc. v.
Powerscreen Int'l Distrib. Ltd., 788 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76-77 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); B. Braun Melsungen
AG v. Terumo Med. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 2d 506, 525-26 (D. Del. 2011); Cordance Corp. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 333, 343-44 (D. Del. 2010); Johnson & Johnson Vision Care,
Inc., v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1290-93 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Judkins v. HT
Window Fashions Corp., 704 F. Supp. 2d 470, 478 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Callaway Golf Co. v.
Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 622 (D. Del. 2008), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 576 F.3d
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401, 420-21 (N.D.
Ohio 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 258 F. App'x 318 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Amgen,
Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 213 (D. Mass. 2008), aff'd in part, vacated
in part and remanded, 580 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500
F. Supp. 2d 556, 590 (E.D. Va. 2007); Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v.
Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607 (E.D. Tex. 2007); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes
(U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (W.D. Tenn. 2006); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 443-44 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
72. Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("The
[ITC] is not required to apply the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief used by district
courts. . . .").
73. E.g., Judkins, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 478 ("[Wlindow blinds are not of serious
importance to the public's health, welfare, or safety.").
74. Callaway Golf Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d at 622 ("Notwithstanding the inevitable
disappointment to such golfers, removing the Pro Vl@ line of balls from commerce after 2008
does not implicate public health or safety concerns.").
75. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 607 ("No such
interests are implicated here since Buffalo's WLAN products are not essential for the public
health or public welfare.").
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that the public interest in strong patent protection trumps, "except in
cases where an obvious interest such as public health and safety
exists."7 6
These cases suggest that the only criteria district courts are
willing to seriously entertain to avoid the exclusionary aspects of the
patent right7 7 in the name of the public interest are those that involve
sickness, injury, or medicine. While this perspective may be too
narrow, it is probably not altogether wrong, and may make sense
because such criteria are among the few "public interests" that do not
discriminate along socioeconomic, gender, or racial divides; it is a
self-reinforcing proposition.
Compounding the issue, case law is not forward looking. It
does not reanalyze how new inventions could create different inroads
to public interest challenges, but rather relies on precedent. Thus, the
health-related perspective may simply be fixed in a closed feedback
loop. This is also true at the ITC, where public health-related
concerns weighed heavily in Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus
and Certain Baseband Processor Chips. And district courts have few
incentives to stray too far from the safety of health-related
considerations-as long as district courts confine their analyses to
health, welfare, and safety, it would be difficult for a court of appeals
to hold that there was an abuse of discretion.
B. Anomalous Considerations at the District Courts
Some district courts have signaled a willingness to consider
other aspects of the public interest, despite the seemingly small subset
of factual scenarios that could traditionally invoke a valid public
interest argument under historical precedent. The definition of public
interest is fundamentally changing as society becomes more reliant on
technology and as economies, both global and local, further develop
interdependent webs.78
76. MPT, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21 ("There is a general public interest in favor of
strong patent protection, except in cases where an obvious public interest such as public health
and safety exists.").
77. The right to exclude is statutorily recognized under the Patent Act.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). See, e.g., WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 18 (1979) ("The
right to property is the power to exclude others from or give them access to a benefit or use of the
particular object."); Patricia L. Farnese, Patently Unreasonable: Reconsidering the Responsibility
of Patentees in Today's Inventive Climate, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 4 (2004) ("A patent
is a property right. Most people associate property rights with ownership."); Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1121 (1990) (defining
property as the "right ... to exclude others from the use of [an] asset").
78. See Scott A. Allen, "Justifying" the Public Interest in Patent Litigation, 88 IND. L.J.
1047, 1085-86 (2013).
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Some post-eBay district courts have recognized that part of the
responsibility inherent in their power to administer equitable relief is
to identify "interests" in relation to changing social norms. For
example, "the public interest factor may favor an infringer when
injunctive relief will result in a socially valuable technology becoming
unavailable."79 With regard to the ITC, it will be up to alleged
infringers to offer reasonable public interest arguments so that the
ITC can redefine the contours of "public interest." To that end, the
following three examples of successful, not directly health-related,
public interest arguments before district courts could help identify
some winning patterns of argumentation. Practitioners are well
advised to study these cases with an eye toward how similar
arguments might work at the ITC and how they might apply to
different factual scenarios before the district courts.
1. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care
In Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp.
(JJVC), two of the largest competitors in the contact lens industry
squared off against each other.80 The district court found CIBA's
patent for a unique silicone hydrogel contact lens valid and infringed
by JJVC. Yet, the district court denied CIBA's motion for a
permanent injunction. While the court examined all of the eBay
factors, as required, its decision turned primarily on public interest
considerations.81
In its brief, the patent holder, CIBA, focused on distinguishing
the typical health-related public interest precedent. It asserted that
its case fell outside of the scenario in which public interest might
trump the grant of a permanent injunction, citing historical precedent
that favored public interest in strong patent rights. CIBA argued that
the case exclusively involved the non-life-saving technology of contact
lenses, which are often worn in lieu of eyeglasses at the prerogative of
a patient, contending that "[a]n injunction covering [JJVC's] Acuvue
Oasys does not implicate public health" and that contact lenses are
79. Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int'l Distrib. Ltd., 788 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76-77
(E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 586 (E.D. Va.
2007) ("Accordingly, the court considers the type of patent involved, the impact on the market,
the impact on the patent system, and any other factor that may impact the public at large and
concludes that, on these facts, the public interest weighs against the entry of an injunction."
(emphasis added)).
80. 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
81. Id. at 1293 ("Here, the consequences of enjoining the ACUVUE@OASYS are not so
grave; nevertheless, this Court, sitting in equity, finds those consequences to be sufficiently
important and adverse to millions of ACUVUEOASYS patients that the public interest would
be disserved if an injunction were to be entered.").
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"not a medical necessity, only a convenience."82 While deployed in an
arguably untactful manner, CIBA correctly pointed out that patients
could simply be refitted for a different brand of contact lens if an
injunction took JJVC's popular Acuvue line of lenses off the market.
And, if a patient remained unsatisfied with an alternative brand of
contact, patients could wear glasses or could elect to have corrective
eye surgery.83  On the whole, CIBA's run-of-the-mill motion for a
permanent injunction conveyed an air of presumptive victory-that
the motion was a formality in the process of obtaining the injunctive
relief that attaches with a patent holder's right to exclude.84
JJVC, however, aggressively opposed the motion and tied the
use of contact lenses back into the realm of public health. Employing
a successful argument from medical device cases, it argued that
patient health is affected by a doctor's option to choose from a
diversity of products depending on patient anatomy.85 It also asserted
that its contact lenses have special UV protection that is unmatched
by the competition and "statistically equivalent to an opaque eye
patch." According to JJVC, this UV protection reduces occurrence of
ocular diseases like cataracts, pterygia, macular degeneration, and
keratitis.8 6
Interestingly, JJVC did not have scientific proof of its medical
assertions at the time. In fact, the Food and Drug Administration
required JJVC's products to include a disclaimer stating that "studies
ha[d] not been done to demonstrate that wearing UV-blocking contact
lenses reduces the risk of developing cataracts or other disorders."87
Undaunted, JJVC also creatively argued that its Acuvue lenses are
the only lenses that dry eye patients could tolerate, even stating that
dry eye is a problem of "epidemic" proportions.8 JJVC was generally
82. CIBA's Motion for a Permanent Injunction at 16-17, Johnson & Johnson Vision
Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2009) (Nos. 3:05-cv-135-
J-32TEM, 3:06-cv-301-J-32TEM), ECF No. 319.
83. Id. at 17.
84. Id.
85. B. Braun Melsungen AG v. Terumo Med. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 2d 506, 525-26 (D.
Del. 2011) ("However, in the overall circumstances presented here, particularly the public
interest in access to competing alternatives to safe medical devices . . . .").
86. Opp. Brief for Johnson & Johnson Vision Care at 25, Johnson & Johnson Vision
Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2010) (Nos. 3:05-cv-
135-J-32TEM, 3:06-cv-301-J-32TEM), ECF No. 347.
87. Reply Brief for CIBA Vision Corp. at 2, 17, Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v.
CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2010) (Nos. 3:05-cv-135-J-32TEM,
3:06-cv-301-J-32TEM), ECF No. 364 ("The FDA requires contact lens companies promoting UV
blocking lenses to include this disclaimer: 'Clinical studies have not been done to demonstrate
that wearing UV-blocking contact lenses reduces the risk of developing cataracts or other
disorders."').
88. Opp. Brief for Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, supra note 86, at 25-26.
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successful in making arguments about "comfort" sound more
health-related than convenience-related. It also created the
appearance that an injunction would immediately force patients into a
"deluge" of contact refitting sessions with optometrists,89 while
common sense suggests that such refittings would be staggered over a
long period of time as different patients ran out of their supply of
lenses at different intervals.90
The court ultimately found JJVC's arguments persuasive,
finding that "millions of innocent contact lens wearers will suffer real
adverse consequences if sale of Acuvue@Oasys is enjoined."91  In
denying the injunction, the court stated its focus was on "not just
issues of comfort or cosmetics," but also on the patients' "proper vision
and eye care." The court failed, however, to specify any particular
vision or eye care issues.92 In reality, the court focused mostly on the
speculated "significant disruption, confusion and cost" for patients
abruptly losing access to JJVC lenses.93 Indeed, the court admitted
that contacts were not the sort of "potentially life-saving technologies"
usually at issue in public interest arguments. The "practical and
economic issues," however, warranted a denial.94
Taking a somewhat bold leap from precedent, the court's
reasoning followed a convenience and economic thread of argument.
In medical device and other health-related fields of technology,
accused infringers may have leeway to bootstrap tangentially related
public interest arguments to core public health rationales. Building
from precedents such as JJVC, litigants can use subsidiary
convenience and economic arguments to ultimately tip the scales in
their favor. If nothing else, JJVC shows that opportunities to
overcome seemingly sure-fire permanent injunctions might be
available to litigants who understand how to push the boundaries of
what constitutes public interest.
2. z4 Technologies
z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. provides another
example of a district court denying a motion for a permanent
89. Id. at 27-28.
90. Reply Brief for CIBA Vision Corp., supra note 87, at 19-20 ("Their visits will
therefore take approximately 15 minutes longer than they would otherwise. These refittings
would be staggered fairly evenly over the year following the injunction and would be orderly.").
91. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1285,
1292 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1293.
770 [Vol. 17:3:751
SHEDDING THE MYOPIC LENS
injunction in the name of the public interest.95 It is difficult to know
how Microsoft shaped its arguments because its briefing is sealed and
no redacted versions exist, but it is apparent from the court's public
opinion that Microsoft argued against the proposed injunction using
many of the same arguments espoused by the court in JJVC.
z4 alleged that Microsoft's Windows and Office programs
infringed its activation software patents. Microsoft's Windows and
Office programs had enormous influence and near ubiquity in 2006.
They are arguably the two most used computer programs in the
world.96 But courts do not deny permanent injunctions because of the
popularity and familiarity of a product. In fact, public interest
arguments focusing on popularity in cases involving enormously
popular medicines97 and technologies98 typically have failed.
In this case, where infringement involved one small feature of
the overall Windows and Office programs, the reasons for denial, at
first, looked particularly dubious. Indeed, the court recognized that
any potential harm to users of Microsoft Windows and Office was
"speculative." Yet, it found that implementing any product redesign,
however small, would have negative consequences given the
"enormous [public] reliance on these products" and the fact that a
redesign could result in the products being taken off the market.99
The court also balked at enjoining Microsoft in light of Microsoft's
assertions that if its servers were deactivated, even for a short time,
"the market would be flooded with illegal, pirated copies" of the
software-copies that Microsoft would be unable to later detect.100
The court reasoned that, "[a]s a result [of the pirated copies entering
the market], unsuspecting public consumers would undoubtedly suffer
some negative consequences."101
Thus, like the JJVC decision, considering the scale of the
public reliance on the infringing products-i.e., the sheer number of
consumers who use the products-coupled with potentially negative
economic consequences, confusion among consumers, and
95. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
96. Id. at 443 ("Microsoft's Windows and Office software products are likely the most
popular software products in the world. The vast majority of computers sold, whether to
individuals, businesses, governments, or educational institutions, run on the Microsoft Windows
operating system and employ the Microsoft Office suite of software.").
97. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 215 (D. Mass. 2008)
aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 580 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (granting an
injunction on Roche's MIRCERA drug despite the public interest).
98. ActiveVideo v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 641, 652-53 (E.D. Va. 2011),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
99. z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 444.
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inconveniences, the court found that the "public interest is likely to be
disserved if a permanent injunction were entered against
Microsoft."10 2 Using similar reasons to those used by the JJVC court,
the z4 Technologies court also made some rather large departures. In
JJVC, contact lenses had some ties back to health and disease
prevention, however tenuous the scientific foundation. In contrast,
the Microsoft products were purely technology related.
The z4 Technologies decision, therefore, teaches that when
technology becomes so fundamental to everyday existence, the public
necessity for any one particular invention may start to mimic the
traits of life-saving technology. Whether in the form of daily contact
lenses or in daily use of a Microsoft program, indiscriminating public
reliance may trump a patent owner's right to exclude.
3. Kohler Co.
In August 2013, a district court denied a motion for permanent
injunction based solely on eBay's public interest factor in a case
involving low-carbon monoxide (CO) marine gas generators typically
used on recreational watercraft.103 Despite the jury finding that the
defendant, Kohler Co., willfully infringed WBIP's patent and the court
denying a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL),
the court refused to enter an injunction.
In an apparent attempt to avoid entanglement with public
interest concerns, WBIP's brief in support of its motion conservatively
asked "only to preclude Kohler from selling new generators," not to
"enjoin users of low-CO gas generators already in the field" or to
enjoin "users from purchasing replacement parts."10 4 And it stated
that it would be amenable to "a reasonable phase out period to
minimize market disruptions."10 5 Kohler's opposition brief was filed
under seal with no accompanying redacted version. It is evident from
the court's short, three-page opinion, however, that WBIP's relatively
modest demands were of no moment in the court's decision. Rather,
after first stating that "the [c]ourt finds that a permanent injunction
would be contrary to the public interest," and questionably noting that
the "[clourt need not address the remaining three [eBay] factors," it
swiftly outlined its view of the pivotal public interest issues. In
particular, it found that since Kohler had fourteen times the
102. Id.
103. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG (D. Mass. Aug. 12, 2013), ECF No.
257 (order denying preliminary injunction).
104. Brief for WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co. at 11, No. 11-10374-NMG (D. Mass. June 18,
2013), ECF No. 224.
105. Id.
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manufacturing capacity as WBIP, an injunction might deprive the
"consuming public of access to a potentially life-saving product."106
The court in WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co. made that decision
despite the fact that Kohler argued in their renewed motion for JMOL
that WBIP's invention was not necessarily saving lives from CO
poisoning, since leaking generator exhaust pipes were the true cause
of several generator-related fatalities.107 As such, the court's decision
was unique. It not only eschewed three of the four required eBay
factors in complete favor of the typically neglected public interest
factor, but also denied an injunction for non-medical technology that
affects the potential health of only a minimal slice of the consuming
population, if any real percentage at all. It did so ostensibly due to
manufacturing capacity, yet never actually addressed the
manufacturing demand for the products at issue.
While this case may not display a judicial willingness to branch
outside the historical norms on public interest, it does show an
expansion in the prominence and importance of making creative and
savvy public interest arguments. Furthermore, since the court also
summarily denied a motion for reconsideration of the denial of a
permanent injunction, the Kohler case also demonstrates a willingness
to stand squarely behind decisions based solely on public interest.a8
V. RELEASING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FROM ITS PREVIOUS CONFINES
With the recent media attention surrounding public interest
considerations,109 combined with changes in public interest
regulations at the ITC, it may be that JJVC, z4 Technologies, and
Kohler are just a small taste of the public interest decisions yet to
come. Whether that potential shift is good or bad for the patent
system as a whole may be debatable, but the opportunity for alleged
infringers to utilize that shift for their benefit is not. There are
several considerations to keep in mind moving forward.
106. WBIP, LLC, No. 11-10374-NMG, ECF No. 257 at 2 (order denying preliminary
injunction).
107. Kohler's Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial at 13, WBIP, LLC v.
Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG (D. Mass. June 18, 2013), ECF No. 226.
108. Mem. Order, WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG (D. Mass. Feb. 12,
2014), ECF No. 274.
109. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 2; Dennis Crouch, Injunctive Relief and the Public
Interest at the ITC, PATENTLYO (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/
injunctive-relief-and-the-public-interest-at-the-itc.html; Jacqueline Bell, ITC Adopts New Public
Interest Rule for Patent Cases, LAW360 (Oct. 19, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/279045; Rossella Brevetti, ITC Amends Rules to Get More Info on Public Interest in
Section 337 Cases, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Oct. 25, 2011) (BNA); Sherr &
Kendall, supra note 1.
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A. The Public Interest Not Confined Statutorily
If Congress wanted to confine public interest to the realm of
public health, public welfare, and public safety, it easily could have
done so. It did not. It is a basic tenet of statutory interpretation that
when Congress could craft limitations, but does not, those limitations
should not be read into a statute.110 So, when "public welfare" and
"public interest" are read, they should be accorded their ordinary
meaning.'11 Likewise, the courts did not limit the equitable eBay
public interest factor to public health, welfare, and safety concerns.
Broadly speaking, welfare can be read as possibly
encapsulating "good fortune, happiness, well-being, or prosperity."11 2
While it is doubtful that a judge is willing to trump the public's
interest in maintaining a strong patent system with robust
exclusionary rights, in favor of his or her subjective belief of public
happiness, it is important to realize that the public interest goes
beyond health concerns. The public's well-being and prosperity reach
far beyond medicine.
In fact, at no point in history has technology had more capacity
to dynamically change lives than now. Unlike our ancestors of a mere
century ago, people, especially in the United States, interact and
depend on technology for a daily existence. Gone are purely agrarian
economies-even soybean seed has taken on a patentable,
high-tech, personality, commanding widespread media attention.113
The Internet, unavailable to most US citizens just twenty years ago,
now plays a prominent role in almost every facet of life. When
crafting public interest arguments seeking to avoid exclusion orders or
injunctive relief, it is important to communicate that the public
110. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994); see also Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003) (noting
that Congress knows how to refer to an "owner" "in other than the formal sense," and did not do
so in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's definition of foreign state "instrumentality"); FCC
v. NextWave Personal Commc'ns, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003) (emphasizing that when
Congress has intended to create exceptions to bankruptcy law requirements, "it has done
so clearly and expressly"); Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996)
("Congress ... demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup
costs, and . . . the language used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that
remedy"); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378 (1954) (finding "no indication that
Congress intended to make this phase of national banking subject to local restrictions, as it has
done by express language in several other instances").
111. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("In the absence of [a statutory] definition,
we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.").
112. Welfare, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1419 (11th ed. 2009).
113. Bowman v. Monsanto, No. 11-796, slip op. 1761 (May 13, 2013); see also, e.g., Adam
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reliance on the invention at issue is commensurate with the way the
public used to rely on the health and safety technologies now taken for
granted. A litigant must take seriously the fact that courts may
consider "any other factor that may impact the public at large."114
This is explored further in the discussion below.
B. Litigation Strategies
1. Relate Technology to Health
While there is room to expand public interest considerations
past the realm of health and safety, there is also no reason to avoid
the path of least resistance when available. As in JJVC, one of the
best arguments an infringer can make against an injunction is to tie
the non-life-threatening technology back to those favorites: health and
safety. The contact lenses at issue in JJVC did not raise huge health
concerns, but the fact they could potentially stave off certain ocular
diseases certainly played a factor in the court's decision.115 Likewise,
in Kohler, the judge found persuasive the accused infringer's
argument that low-emission generators could save lives and denied an
injunction. Thus, wherever possible, present the infringing technology
in a way that highlights for the judge its health-related, life-saving, or
safety aspects.
For example, in Certain Baseband Processor Chips, where a
public interest exception was found, the respondent successfully
argued that devices used by EMS personnel incorporated its infringing
chips.116 Thus, the respondent argued, its products were vital to
emergency response teams. Cloaking non-life-threatening technology
in the shrouds of vital health and safety concerns can help turn an
otherwise low-percentage, but not impossible, argument into a pivotal
win for a client.
114. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 586 (E.D. Va. 2007)
("Accordingly, the court considers the type of patent involved, the impact on the market, the
impact on the patent system, and any other factor that may impact the public at large and
concludes that, on these facts, the public interest weighs against the entry of an injunction."
(emphasis added)).
115. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285,
1292 (M.D. Fla. 2010) ("These are not just issues of comfort or cosmetics, as CIBA argues, but
rather deal with the more substantive concerns of proper vision and eye care.").
116. Certain Baseband Processor Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258 at 105
(Oct. 2011) (Final).
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2. Argue Reliance
Microsoft, the accused infringer in the z4 Technologies case,
demonstrated another strategy-large public reliance on the
infringing product. Microsoft argued that a permanent injunction
would force it to redesign its product, which would affect the
accessibility of its products to the public, even for just a short period of
time. Accepting that line of argument, the district court held that
"any minor disruption to the distribution of the products in question"
would have a negative effect on the public "due to the public's
undisputed and enormous reliance on these products."117
While Microsoft Windows and Office may be unique examples
of publicly relied upon products, our daily lives are becoming
increasingly more intertwined with technology. Thus, the possibilities
for making such public interest arguments will continue to expand.
For instance, in JJVC, part of the defendant's successful argument to
avoid an injunction on its contact lenses included appealing to the
notion that the lenses were so comfortable that running the risk that
"new lenses may not prove as efficacious" for patients would lead to
"deleterious effects ... too great to permit."118
Professor Robert Merges, of the University of California,
Berkeley, has discussed using "reliance" as a means of justifying an
exception to the patent holder's typical right to exclude infringers.
Specifically, discussing the scholarship of Wendy Gordon, Merges
noted that "[a]n original creator can add something that others come
to depend on in an important way" and that "if that creator tries to
remove what he or she has added, people may experience an
important loss."119 In other words, Merges posits that it is possible to
make the public worse off by exposure to life-changing-but not
necessarily life-saving-technology, only to have it removed or altered
by patent rights.
For example, Certain Baseband Processor Chips, where 3G
wireless devices had truly revolutionized communication, presents
such a case. While Merges also recognizes that "[m]ost contribution[s]
to culture are like isolated drops in a lake" and removing them "would
117. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443-44 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
118. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
119. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 52-53 (2011) ("The
creator's contribution adds so significantly to what was there that it is wrong to permit the
creator to pull back what he or she contributed, to remove it from circulation."); see also Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1567 (1993) ("[O]nce a creator exposes her intellectual
property to the public, and that product influences the stream on culture and events, excluding
the public from access to it can harm.").
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barely cause a ripple,"120 the opportunity for creative advocacy by
utilizing a "reliance" theory is important. In other words, only the
rare, canonical invention, like the Internet, may change a cultural
baseline from an academic perspective.12 1 In real world applications,
however, courts or the ITC may be willing to explore this justification
when determining whether to issue injunctions and exclusion orders
in any given case depending on the facts.
3. The Environment, National Security, and Other Considerations
Successful strategies often require layering. As discussed
above, winning arguments in JJVC and Certain Baseband Processor
Chips appealed to traditional health-related concerns while also
playing on the notion of public reliance. Even in Certain Fluidized
Supporting Apparatus, where the decision appeared to turn on health
concerns along with a public reliance on the "expanding" market for
hospital burn beds, it was difficult to remove the fluidized burn beds
from the marketplace once patients experienced the additional
comfort.
Other considerations might also be layered to bolster
arguments. For example, in Kohler and Certain Automatic Crankpin
Grinders, the low-emissions and fuel-reducing aspects of the
technology at issue channeled concerns over the environment. Like
health and safety, environmental concerns have universal appeal and
do not discriminate along socioeconomic lines. Certain Inclined-Field
Acceleration Tubes and aspects of Certain Baseband Processor Chips
unquestionably raised issues of national security: the ability to
develop nuclear arms and nuclear energy as well as the ability to
effectively communicate during large-scale national disasters, such as
the September 11 attacks. Drawing from several previously successful
lines of argumentation simultaneously-whether from the ITC or the
federal district courts-may ultimately provide the most persuasive
public interest defense.
4. Narrow and Tailored Injunctions
A final strategy worth consideration is arguing that the public
interest favors a narrower injunction or a sunset provision on the
injunction. The district court's decision on remand in Presidio
Components Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp.,122 for
120. MERGES, supra note 119, at 55.
121. Id. at 52-53.
122. No. 08-cv-335-IEG-NLS (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2013), ECF No. 432.
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example, provides helpful insight into the potential utility of arguing
for a narrow injunction. In Presidio, the district court originally
denied a permanent injunction partly because "enjoining the sale of
[infringing] capacitors will hurt important government, military,
space, and infrastructure projects, as well as many critical civilian
industries."123  On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the district
court's ruling denying the permanent injunction, but did not
specifically vacate the public interest portion of the analysis.124
Interestingly, on remand, the district court issued a permanent
injunction but, partially in light of the public interest, ordered that
"the effective date of the injunction will be September 1, 2013, to allow
American Technical Ceramics (ATC) to finish shipping those 545L
capacitors that had been ordered prior to the date of oral
argument."125
Such sunset provisions can be extremely valuable. In Presidio,
the court order permitted ATC to ship its remaining inventory of a
product that it was discontinuing, greatly reducing the economic
burden resulting from the permanent injunction.126 The ITC, in
Certain Baseband Processor Chips fashioned a similar remedy. In
that investigation, the exclusion order included a sunset provision
allowing the respondents time to phase its infringing products off the
market, a result "having a much more limited impact on availability of
3G-capable handsets, and thus a lesser impact on the public
interest."127 Thus, even when a permanent injunction or an exclusion
order seems imminent, it is possible that the "public interest" can still
provide an inroad to a less severe outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, "public interest" had been relegated to a relatively
trivial existence. Over the last decade, however, public interest
exceptions to injunctions and exclusion orders have silently crept close
to the limelight-both at the district courts and at the ITC. Recently,
the public interest has even garnered some media attention. It is no
longer the case that district courts are only willing to seriously
entertain public interest arguments that involve sickness, injury, or
123. Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1284,
1339 (S.D. Cal., 2010).
124. Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1362-64
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
125. Presidio, No. 08-cv-335-IEG-NLS, ECF No. 432.
126. Id.
127. Certain Baseband Processor Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258 at 105
(Oct. 2011) (Final).
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medicine. Whether this trend is good for the patent system or
denigrates patents as property rights is certainly open for debate. But
the fact that opportunities exist for creative advocacy is not.
Practitioners and litigants alike would be amiss in not considering and
formulating public interest offenses and defenses going forward.
Implementing strategies discussed in this Article may allow the wary
and observant to snatch victory from the proverbial jaws of defeat.

